A2J Isn’t Just a Legal Problem — It’s an Economic One
1. Introduction
The internet flattens the world, allowing equal access to all largely without cost, right? Wrong. The internet allows access to all sorts of information, but only after algorithms funnel users to specific websites. And as discussed here, litigants searching for help are algorithmically funneled to courts—not to low-cost self-help providers.
With modern legal technology now widely available, the primary constraint on access to justice is no longer the absence of tools. It is the inability of those tools to reach the litigants who need them. This article provides background for that gap, shows how it gives courts a unique opportunity to help, and recommends some solutions and innovations, all based on recent experiences in this realm seeking to create new pathways to justice.
2. Quest for Justice
Quest for Justice launched in 2019 to develop technology for people who fall into what it terms middle cases: litigants who do not qualify for legal aid and who cannot afford full legal representation or for whom full representation is not cost-effective, but who can still pay something for limited help.
In 2021, 2022 and 2023, Quest for Justice released a suite of free and affordable guided-interview tools, including demand letters, small-claims filing tools, and trial-presentation builders. It also launched an Arizona ABS law firm, JusticeDirect, to provide limited-scope legal services to serve higher-value middle cases.
While these tools worked extremely well for users, demonstrated by hundreds of five-star ratings on the review website TrustPilot, they did not scale. The reason was neither regulatory nor technical. It was economic.
3. The Customer Acquisition Cost Problem: Why Self-Help Tools Don’t Reach the People Who Need Them
In theory, low-cost digital tools should be perfect for self-represented litigants. In practice, they face a structural barrier: customer acquisition cost (CAC). As used here, CAC means the marketing and sales spend required to acquire a paying user.
Most litigants start their legal search in one of two ways:
- An internet search engine, here using Google search as a common example
- Directly accessing court resources
3.1 Google Search
Providers appear in Google search results in one of two ways: organically or through paid advertising.
3.1.1 Organic Search
Organic search results are the non-advertising portion of search engine results, where content appears based on relevance, authority, and credibility rather than paid advertising.
As this example shows, court websites consistently dominate the top organic positions.
One common way organizations try to improve organic visibility is by publishing large volumes of useful help content to build authority over time. But even that approach will not overcome the built-in advantage of court domains: Justice Direct’s lawyers wrote hundreds of detailed, plain-language legal help articles—optimized by professional search engine optimization specialists—yet in many jurisdictions those pages still did not rank anywhere close to the court’s own website for the most relevant user queries. And because user-behavior research shows most people click results on the first page of search results, rarely going to page two, resources that rank behind court sites are effectively invisible to most litigants (see Nielsen Norman Group, “Good Abandonment on Search Results Pages,” 2020; Backlinko/ClickFlow CTR Study, 2019, updated 2025).
So why do courts get this “first page” treatment? It is because courts:
- have decades-old domains,
- possess high authority and extensive backlink profiles, and
- are inherently trusted institutions.
As a result, litigants searching for help are algorithmically funneled to courts—where their cases are resolved—not to service providers, including low-cost self-help providers. That is a problem.
3.1.2 Paid Advertising
Paid advertising skews the search engine results based on advertising bids rather than relevance.
Legal keywords are among the most expensive in the entire advertising industry:
- Personal injury keywords regularly cost hundreds of dollars per click (see “75 Personal Injury Keywords” at rankings.io) meaning thousands of dollars per client
- Even “small claims”–related keywords routinely cost more than $100 per client
These prices may be sustainable for full-representation law firms because a single client can generate tens of thousands of dollars in revenue. But they are not sustainable for providers of low-cost tools ($20–$100). CAC exceeds revenue many times over.
JusticeDirect’s revenue and CAC costs for services geared toward the middle cases prove the point.
| Service | Description | Revenue | CAC | Loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Demand Letter | Use AI to generate a demand letter and have it sent via certified mail. | $30 | $258 | -$228 |
| Attorney Demand Letter | JD’s attorney drafts a demand letter on behalf of the client. | $300 | $436 | -$136 |
| Small Claims Lawsuit | JD helps clients fill out the small claims form, file, serve, and organize their evidence. | $350 | $436 | -$86 |
Figure 2: JusticeDirect services broken down by revenue vs CAC
Obviously, these numbers are not sustainable. With these numbers, it made no sense for JusticeDirect to scale its business by investing heavily in advertising.
3.2 Bypass Google entirely
A significant percentage of litigants skip search engines and go directly to:
- Court self-help centers (in person)
- Court website self-help pages
- Clerk counters
These litigants never encounter low-cost providers at all. Courts are the only destination they contact. If the court self-help centers or pages are good, they will get some help. But even if they are good, they will not get any information about low-cost providers, other than the information the self-help centers or pages may offer, which often is limited and frequently is not up to date.
3.3 Conclusion
Because low-cost providers:
- cannot rank in organic search,
- cannot afford paid advertising to improve their rank in search results, and
- cannot reach litigants who bypass searches entirely,
courts become the primary—and often the only—access point for lower-middle and economically non-viable cases.
This is not a technology failure, or a lack of caring by the courts. It is a distribution failure driven by CAC economics.
4. The Pivot Revealed the Systemic Issue
To survive economically, JusticeDirect pivoted from serving all middle cases to serving only upper-middle cases—where attorney involvement could be justified by case economics. This allowed the organization to exceed CAC by pairing technology with attorney services.
The unintended consequence was predictable: lower-middle cases were left behind.
The self-help tools remained available, but without a viable distribution channel, only a small number of users discovered them organically. This limitation is not unique to one organization; it applies to every entity attempting to deliver low-cost legal help through market channels.
5. Rethinking A2J Segments: An Economic-Based, Not Income-Based, Framework
Most A2J discussions divide cases into two groups: those where litigants can afford an attorney and those where they cannot. This income-based framing is intuitive, but it oversimplifies the real drivers of representation. It assumes that the ability to pay is the primary determinant of whether a lawyer is engaged.
In practice, the nature and economics of the case matter just as much—and often more—than the litigant’s financial situation. There are many situations where even a wealthy litigant cannot economically justify hiring an attorney (for example, a $2,500 contract dispute), and many situations where a low-income litigant can obtain full representation because the value or structure of the case supports it (for example, a personal injury claim against an insured defendant). Between these extremes lie cases where limited or partial representation may be economically rational.
To more accurately describe how legal services actually function, it is more useful to segment cases based on what level of assistance the case can economically support, rather than on litigant income alone.
5.1. Full Representation Cases
These are cases where full attorney representation makes economic sense regardless of the litigant’s income because the structure or value of the case supports it.
Full representation is viable when:
- contingency fees align attorney compensation with outcomes (e.g., personal injury or certain employment claims);
- corporate clients or insurers pay legal fees directly;
- a corporate or similar party, who cannot represent itself, sues or is sued; or
- statutory fee-shifting allows attorneys to be compensated by the opposing party.
In these scenarios, lawyers are willing to accept open-ended professional involvement because the expected return justifies the cost and risk.
5.2. Upper Middle Cases (Limited-Scope or Bounded Representation)
These are cases where full representation is disproportionate to the value at stake, but bounded attorney involvement—often through fixed-fee or limited-scope arrangements—is economically reasonable and provides meaningful value.
A practical rule of thumb may be that if the amount in dispute is large enough that a litigant is rationally willing to pay approximately $500–$1000 for legal guidance, the case falls within this segment. For many jurisdictions, this corresponds to disputes above roughly $10,000, but less than full representation levels, where paying a few hundred dollars for strategic attorney involvement is economically rational, but open-ended litigation is not.
Significantly, the limiting factor in these cases is often not income in the traditional sense, but liquidity and risk exposure. Outside of contingency or fee-shifting contexts, full representation is typically priced on an hourly basis. Hourly billing introduces uncertainty and open-ended financial commitment, and total fees can quickly reach five figures. Even when paying for a lawyer would be economically rational relative to what is at stake, many households— including middle-class households—cannot absorb the upfront cash requirements or the risk associated with $10,000–$20,000 or more in potential legal fees.
As a result, the market response in this segment is not full representation, but bounded representation. Fixed-fee and limited-scope arrangements emerge precisely because they reduce uncertainty, cap downside risk, and align legal services with what the case can realistically support.
5.3. Lower Middle Cases (Self-Help Tools Segment)
These are cases where attorney involvement does not make economic sense, even on a limited or bounded basis, because the value of the case cannot absorb the fixed costs and professional risk associated with attorney participation.
However, litigants in this segment are often willing to pay modest amounts for structured assistance through technology, such as:
- guided interviews;
- document generators;
- AI-assisted narrative or evidence organization tools; and
- filing assistance systems.
Typical price points in this segment may range from $10–$100. These cases support tools, not lawyers.
5.4. Economically Non-Viable Cases
These are cases where the value at stake is so low that no paid solution is economically realistic, regardless of litigant income.
Characteristics include:
- extremely low monetary value;
- situations where even nominal fees are prohibitive; and
- cases that cannot support market solutions of any kind.
This segment requires fully external support, such as free court-provided technology-based tools, legal aid, or pro bono services.
5.5 Why Segmentation by Case Economics Matters
This framework reflects the economic logic of practical legal decision-making more accurately than income-based categories.
Middle-class and wealthy litigants regularly encounter cases where hiring a lawyer makes no financial sense. Conversely, low-income litigants frequently obtain full representation in cases supported by contingency arrangements or fee-shifting statutes.
The critical question, therefore, is not “Does the litigant have money to hire an attorney?” but rather:
“What level of legal assistance does this case economically support, and to what extent?”
Framing access to justice around case economics leads to more realistic policymaking and clearer institutional roles for courts, technology providers, legal aid organizations, and the private bar.
6. Where Courts Come In: Solving the Distribution Problem
Courts already have what legal-tech innovators lack:
Zero-CAC access to the exact people who need help.
By virtue of search dominance and their role as the default physical and digital destination, courts are uniquely positioned to solve the distribution problem. Court action, however, is needed for courts to use this dominance to close the A2J gap. Two practical ways are suggested here.
7. Two Practical Ways Courts Can Close the A2J Gap
7.1. Deploy Modern Guided-Interview Tools
Courts can license and embed modern guided-interview technology (see “From Static Forms to Intelligent Systems: The Next Transformation in Court Access Part 2: How AI Can Solve the Problem of Static Forms“) directly into their online self-help centers.
This approach:
- Eliminates CAC for the provider
- Reduces clerk counter burden
- Improves filing accuracy and consistency
- Supports Americans with Disabilities Act compliance
- Ensures equal access regardless of income or case type
- Helps ensure pro se cases are Judge ready.
To account for cost concerns — given courts have limited budgets — there are ways to structure implementation to make deployment financially feasible.
For example, courts can pass the cost of tools onto the end-users. If an end-user is non-indigent, they will be able to pay the fee. If, however, the user is indigent, then the fee waiver model can apply allowing them to use the tool at no cost.
7.2. Court-Approved Resource Directory
Another option doesn’t require courts to buy technology at all. They can also create a simple directory listing:
- Nonprofit legal-tech tools
- Low-cost for-profit self-help tools
- Court-approved guided interviews
By directing litigants to this page, courts solve the CAC problem for every organization working in the A2J space. This low-effort step dramatically increases access to resources that many litigants would never encounter on their own.
8. How Courts Can Move Forward
Addressing the A2J distribution gap does not require assuming new roles, building new institutions, or entering unfamiliar policy territory. It requires coordinated use of authority and infrastructure courts already possess.
In practice, successful initiatives tend to align three existing functions within the judicial system.
8.1 Judicial Leadership
Judges play an essential but limited role in addressing the issue. Judicial leadership provides legitimacy, clarity, and confidence.
Judicial participation can include:
- approving standardized language directing self-represented litigants to court-approved resources,
- supporting pilot programs through administrative or standing orders,
- signaling that structured self-help tools are consistent with court expectations and procedural fairness.
These actions fall squarely within courts’ inherent authority to manage proceedings and ensure meaningful access, without favoring any party or outcome, and further the core mission of courts serving the public.
8.2 Court Administration
Court administrators are central to implementation and sustainability.
Administrators understand:
- where self-represented litigants encounter the greatest friction,
- which case types generate the most repeat filings, continuances, or staff intervention,
- how self-help centers, clerk counters, and online resources are actually used.
From an institutional perspective, administrators are best positioned to:
- identify appropriate pilot case types,
- integrate tools into existing workflows,
- evaluate impact using operational metrics rather than anecdotes.
Their role ensures that A2J initiatives remain practical, measured, and aligned with court operations.
8.3 Technical Implementation
Courts do not need to become technology developers.
Implementation may be handled by internal IT staff, external vendors, or hybrid arrangements. The technologist’s role is execution, not policy: integrating tools into court systems, ensuring accessibility and reliability, and adapting resources to applicable rules and procedures.
When courts articulate clear objectives and boundaries, technical partners can operate effectively without altering judicial processes.
8.4 A Measured and Low-Risk Approach
Courts need not address the entire A2J landscape at once.
A typical, institutionally conservative approach involves:
- selecting a single high-volume case type with significant self-represented participation,
- piloting a guided interview or referral resource for that case type,
- evaluating effects on filing quality, staff workload, and litigant comprehension,
- expanding incrementally based on observed results.
This mirrors how courts have historically adopted procedural and administrative innovations: cautiously, empirically, and with attention to institutional impact.
Together, these roles demonstrate that courts already possess the authority, infrastructure, and capacity needed to address the A2J distribution gap in a measured and institutionally appropriate way.
9. Conclusion: Courts Hold the Missing Piece
With modern legal technology now widely available, the primary constraint on access to justice is no longer the absence of tools. It is the inability of those tools to reach the litigants who need them.
Market-based distribution has proven inadequate. Customer acquisition costs make it economically impossible for low-cost providers to reliably reach lower-middle and economically non-viable cases. Instead, courts are the default—and often the only—point of contact for self-represented litigants.
That position gives courts a unique opportunity to help narrow the A2J gap.
By embedding structured self-help tools, curating referral resources, or both, courts can ensure that existing solutions are discoverable, accessible, and used at the point where litigants already turn for help. No new authority is required. No departure from judicial norms is necessary.
The A2J persists not because courts lack capacity, but because distribution has been left to systems that were never designed to serve middle and low-value cases. Courts are the one institution positioned to correct that mismatch.
In doing so, courts do not replace the market, legal aid, or the private bar. They enable each to function where it is effective—and ensure that cases the market cannot serve are not left without support.